Perhaps the most revealing and poignant moment of the campaign came when President Ford, asked what sacrifices he would call on the American people to make, replied: "The American people will be called upon to tighten their belts a bit in meeting some of the problems that we face domestically." That would mean less spending, but Ford quickly added, "We could, I think, have a long overdue and totally justified tax decrease for the middle-income people." Then, with no sense of irony whatsoever, he repeated a call for reduced federal spending and "a tax reduction primarily for the middle-income people," adding that "the American people would be willing to make those sacrifices...in the next four years."

The idea that a call for sacrifice to meet threats to national survival might counter bread-and-butter economics never appeared in the President's briefing book and was obvously absent from his thoughts.

Carter's most obvious and most heavily publicized electoral base was his overwhelming support from black voters, North and South (which seems a permanent Democratic asset), and backing from his Southern heartland (which may be a one-time occurence). Even so, Carter would have been defeated had he not scored substantially among white industrial workers and their families. These votes provided the narrow margin of victory in New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Had Ford won two of those three states, he would have been elected.

These blue-collar voters are the nation's deepest well of patriotic fervor. The antidote to Democratic bread-and-butter arguments must be a call for sacrifice at a time of international danger -- precisely the call that Ford did not make and apparently was incapable of making. [ital in orig]

Source: Novak, Robert D. Fiasco '76. National Review. p. 1398. December 24, 1976.

The results of the "Sunday Morning Massacre," which came as a total surprise to the White House, activated the anti-Communist Right behind Reagan and validated his challenge for the nomination. But more important than these ill effects was what the sacking of Schlesinger showed about Ford.

Whether or not Donald Rumsfeld was the eminence grise in pushing out Schlesinger, as has been charged and denied, it is clear that Ford deeply resented his Secretary of Defense's pugnacious advocacy of Pentagon spending against Budget Director James T. Lynn. The President was entranced by Lynn's siren song of saving $7 billion through defense cuts and gave up that notion only under pressure from Reagan. The notion of a strong push for national defense as good politics against his Democratic foe a year later never entered Ford's mind as he dispatched the annoying Mr. Schlesinger.

Source: Novak, Robert D. Fiasco '76. National Review. p. 1397. December 24, 1976.

Ford as President often attempted the old congressional routine, with invariably poor results -- particularly on the common situs picketing bill permitting secondary boycotts in the construction industry. Although he had consistently opposed this old chestnut of organized labor during his years in the House, President Ford was talked into sponsoring it by his Secretary of Labor, John Dunlop. When Congress passed it, he was bombarded by protests from disconsolate construction executives. Faced by Reagan's challenge, the President vetoed the bill with these reults: Secretary Dunlop's resignation, mobilization of building-trades unions against him, suspicion from businessmen who could not understand why they had to pressure a Republican President, outrage by Republican congressmen who had voted for the bill because they thought Ford had sanitized it.

Ford's flip-flop on common situs picketing was possible because he had no strong views on that or much of anything else -- another characteristic of Republican congressmen who can survive for 25 years. If they go along with the general sentiments of their constituency and exhibit a Main Street business conservatism, there is no need to adoptideological consistency on broader questions.

Source: Novak, Robert D. Fiasco '76. National Review. p. 1398. December 24, 1976.

Ford's fairly effective theme, during the campaign's closing ten days, of warning that Democrats mean higher taxes and, therefore, lower paychecks is part of the answer. But beyond that, Republicans must attempt what Ford did not, to convince workingmen that the GOP is not their economic enemy at the rudimentary level of collective bargaining. Or, put another way: while Republicans are death on heavy government spending, high taxes, and "particularly" profligate welfare outlays, they are even-handed neutrals in the war between management and labor.

This involves a renewed pursuit of an alliance with some elements of organized labor begun by that tainted master politician, Richard M. Nixon, and abandoned after his fall. Yet, the backbone of the party, the small-town merchants and manufacturers, who even now are not ashamed to be called Republicans, oppose any such courtship.

The fact that the labor movement is split irreconcilably on key questions of national defense and international affairs is lost on the country-club Republican. In his heart he feels that the real threat to his nation comes not from Leonid Brezhnev but from George Meany. In particular, that surviving fraction in the House of Representatives is emotionally more anti-labor than anti-Communist.

Source: Novak, Robert D. Fiasco '76. National Review. p. 1398. December 24, 1976.